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Is Intellectual Character Growth a Realistic Educational Aim?
Responsibilist approaches to virtue epistemology examine the epistemic significance of
intellectual virtues like curiosity, attentiveness, intellectual humility, open-mindedness, intellectual
courage, and intellectual tenacity (Battaly, 2008). On one way of thinking about these traits, they are
the deep personal qualities or character traits of a good thinker or learner. Given the intimate
connection between intellectual virtues and good thinking and learning, responsibilist virtue
epistemology appears ripe for application to educational theory and practice (Baehr, 2016). At a
minimum, growth in intellectual virtues seems like a worthy educational aim.
But is this aim realistic? There are at least three objections to thinking that it is. According to
the first objection, there is no such thing as intellectual virtue; or, if intellectual virtue exists, it is a
very rare phenomenon. This objection is rooted in empirical data from social psychology purporting
to show that the activity associated with intellectual virtues either does not exist or is attributable,
not to any stable dispositions of intellectual character, but to epistemically insignificant and often
trivial situational influences (see e.g. Alfano, 2012). If this is right, the objection goes, then
intellectual character growth is a profoundly unrealistic and misguided educational aim. Call this the
“situationist objection.”
According to a second objection, while intellectual virtues may not be especially rare, it
remains unrealistic to think that growth in these qualities can be fostered in an educational setting.
Such growth amounts to deep personal change. Given that the intellectual character of most
students is substantially formed by the time they enter the classroom, and given the limited role that
most teachers can hope to play in the lives of their students, it is unrealistic to think that teachers

can foster the kind of personal transformation central to intellectual character growth. Call this the
“transformation objection.”
According to a third objection, while it may be possible for teachers to have a significant
impact on the intellectual character of their students, doing so would require a major expenditure of
scarce educational resources (e.g. public dollars, instructional minutes, and professional development
programming). Most schools and teachers possess these resources in very limited quantities.
Therefore, while intellectual character growth may be achievable in a narrow range of cases, it is not
realistically achievable on a wide scale. Call this the “costliness objection.”
In this paper, I defend the enterprise of educating for growth in intellectual virtues against
each of these objections. Specifically, I rebut the situationist and transformation objections and
attempt to blunt the force of the costliness objection. In doing so, I also adduce some positive
support for this enterprise. I conclude that if pursued in the right way, intellectual character growth
is a worthy and realistic educational aim—one that justifies rethinking some fundamental
educational priorities and practices.

1. Situationist Objection

I begin with a discussion of the situationist objection, which is intended to cast doubt on
intellectual character growth as an educational aim on the grounds that intellectual virtues are
(largely) a fictitious construct. While most situationist research and arguments to date have targeted
moral character and virtues (e.g. Harman, 1999; Doris, 1998, 2002), the situationist critique has
recently been extended to virtue epistemology (e.g. Alfano, 2012, 2013). As noted above,
situationists have argued that most people’s supposedly intellectually virtuous activity is better
explained by epistemically arbitrary situational factors than by traits like open-mindedness,

intellectual honesty, or intellectual thoroughness. My focus in this section is on two empirical studies
that have figured prominently in these arguments. For reasons that will eventually become clear, I
divide these studies into three parts. While the scope of my discussion will be limited to these
studies, I attempt to compensate for this limitation by introducing several assumptions that favor the
situationist position (for a more extensive response to the application of situationism to virtue
epistemology, see Baehr, forthcoming).1
The pertinent studies are as follows:

CANDLE-1: In a study by Alice Isen and colleagues (1987), participants were given a book
of matches, a box of thumbtacks, and a candle. They were asked to attach the candle to the
wall in such a way that when the candle is lit, no wax drips on the floor. (The solution: take
the tacks out of the box, pin the box to the wall, then place the candle upright in the box.) It
does not seem unreasonable to think that completing this task might require a certain kind
of intellectual flexibility—indeed a kind which, if internalized and habituated in the right
way, could be an intellectual character virtue. The results: only 13% of participants were able
to complete the task. However, when the tacks were presented to participants outside of the
box, thereby making the solution to the puzzle more apparent, the completion rate jumped
to 83% (Alfano, 2012, pp. 236-7). On the assumption that solving the former version of the
task requires intellectual flexibility but solving the latter version does not, one lesson to be
drawn from these findings, per situationism, is that most people lack intellectual flexibility

CANDLE-2: In the same study, a second group of participants was presented with the more
challenging, tacks-inside-the-box version of the task, but was also given a “mood enhancer.”
Specifically, each person was given some candy or shown a brief comedy immediately prior

to being asked to complete the task. Surprisingly, 75% of participants went on to discover
the solution, compared with 13% in the control group. The conclusion urged by situationists
is that while most people may be disposed to engage in intellectually flexible activity under
these conditions, doing so is not an indication of the virtue of intellectual flexibility, for we
expect a genuinely virtuous person to engage in virtue-relevant activity without reliance on
mood enhancers or similar expedients (Alfano, 2012, p. 236). Put another way, the upshot is
that most people are at best intellectually flexible only in a very weak or insignificant sense.

LINES: In a now famous series of experiments conducted in the 1950s, Solomon Asch
sought to determine the extent to which group pressure might cause people to deny the clear
evidence of their senses. In one such experiment (1963), seven confederates and a single
participant were shown a series of line pairs and asked to identify the longer of the two lines.
While the answer was always clear to the naked eye, Asch found that when all seven of the
confederates answered incorrectly (identifying the shorter line as longer), the lone participant
regularly registered agreement. Specifically, he found that while approximately one quarter of
participants refused to agree with the majority, roughly a third agreed more often than not,
and 50 to 80 percent of participants agreed at least once. Subsequent experiments identified
various limitations on these findings (Alfano, 2013, p. 134). For instance, it was discovered
that the group effect disappears when the disagreement is anything short of unanimous and
when the size of a unanimously dissenting group is sufficiently small. It is also generally
agreed that the participants in this sort of experiment do not actually disbelieve the evidence of
their senses but rather are simply unwilling to assert what they believe. These qualifications
notwithstanding, there is some plausibility to the situationist suggestion that, when

participants do register agreement with the majority, they fail to demonstrate a kind of
intellectual courage called for in the situation.

Before examining the implications of these findings, I want briefly to identify a few (quite
generous) assumptions that will guide the remainder of the discussion. Each one is intended to
bolster the situationist position and thus to give it the best possible opportunity for success. First, I
will assume that the activity targeted by these experiments is indeed characteristic of the virtues in
question, such that a failure to engage in this activity is at least prima facie relevant to the question of
how widely these virtues are possessed. Second, I will assume that the behavior of the subjects in
these experiments is representative of how most people would act under similar conditions. Third,
and most importantly, I will assume that similar experiments could be designed for the full range of
intellectual virtues and that the results would be comparable and capable of being replicated on a
wide scale. Taken together, these assumptions will allow us to generalize on the research in a way
that will be helpful for assessing the prospects of the objection at hand. Specifically, if the
situationist objection to educating for growth in intellectual virtues is found wanting even given these
charitable assumptions, this will be a significant finding.

1.1. Levels of Intellectual Virtue

While a completely thorough treatment of CANDLE-1, CANDLE-2, and LINES would
take us beyond the scope of this paper, I intend to say enough about these studies to drive a wedge
between the empirical data and the situationist conclusion. Specifically, I will argue that the data fail
to show that moderate levels of intellectual virtue are rare. This, we will see, is sufficient for

neutralizing the situationist threat to treating intellectual character growth as a realistic educational
aim.
We may begin by identifying a conspicuous ambiguity in the situationist thesis. Situationists
take the data in question to show that most people lack intellectual virtues. However, intellectual
virtues can be possessed in degrees. A person can be more or less open-minded, intellectually honest,
or intellectually tenacious. This raises the question of how, more precisely, the situationist thesis is
supposed to be understood. Is the idea that few people are intellectually virtuous to any extent at all?
Or merely that few are maximally or fully intellectually virtuous? The difference is important. If the
research shows merely that maximal or full intellectual virtue is rare, this does little to undermine the
idea that intellectual character growth is a viable educational aim. It leaves wide open the possibility
that something like moderate or even robust intellectual virtue can be fostered on a wide scale.
Therefore, to pinpoint the force of the situationist argument, it will be helpful to draw some
distinctions between different levels of intellectual virtue. I propose to do so in terms of the
following three criteria:

Scope: For a given person S and virtue V, does S engage in V-relevant activity across a wide
range of V-relevant contexts?

Frequency: For a given person S and virtue V, how frequently does S engage in V-relevant
activity?

Motivation: To what extent is S’s V-relevant activity robustly epistemically motivated?

The foregoing questions point to three main dimensions on account of which a person can
possess an intellectual virtue to a greater or lesser degree. The concepts of scope and frequency
should be clear enough: a person who engages in open-minded intellectual activity frequently and
across a wide range of situations that call for this activity will be more open-minded than a person
who does so only occasionally or within a narrow range of contexts. The concept of “robust
epistemic motivation,” however, requires some clarification. In keeping with how several virtue
responsibilists conceive of the motivational dimension of intellectual virtues, I propose that S’s Vrelevant activity is robustly epistemically motivated only if (a) it is motivated by an epistemic good as
such and this motivation (b) is strong enough to cause the activity and (c) does not depend on any
epistemically arbitrary situational influences. Condition (a) is rooted in the idea that intellectual
virtues have an element of intrinsic motivation—that an intellectually virtuous person has some
concern for truth or knowledge as such (i.e. her intellectually virtuous activity is not motivated solely
by a concern with non-epistemic ends). It does not follow, however, that activity manifesting an
intellectual virtue must be motivated strictly by a concern with epistemic goods as such. An
intellectually virtuous person can care about epistemic goods for other reasons as well (Baehr, 2011,
Ch. 6; Zagzebski, 1996). This raises the question of how strong the intrinsic motivational element
must be in order to count as “robust” in the relevant sense. Condition (b) addresses this issue by
stipulating that it must be strong enough to cause the activity in question. Finally, condition (c)
requires that the motivation not be dependent on any epistemically arbitrary factors, including minor
tweaks in the person’s environment or the ingestion of a mood enhancer. Where the motivation is
this fragile or contingent, it is insufficiently robust to manifest intellectual virtue.
Relying on these criteria, we are now in a position to mark a distinction between “full virtue”
and “moderate virtue”:

Full virtue (FV): S is fully virtuous in respect of V only if: (a) S engages in V-relevant activity
across all (or nearly all) V-relevant contexts; (b) in all (or nearly all) V-relevant contexts, S
always (or nearly always) engages in V-relevant activity when doing so is called for; and (c) in
all (or nearly all) V-relevant contexts, S’s V-relevant activity is always (or nearly always)
robustly epistemically motivated.

Moderate virtue (MV): S is moderately virtuous in respect of V only if: (a) S engages in Vrelevant activity across several V-relevant contexts; (b) in several V-relevant contexts, S
regularly engages in V-relevant activity when doing so is called for; and (c) in several Vrelevant contexts, S’s V-relevant activity is regularly robustly epistemically motivated.

The characterization of MV makes use of terms like “several” and “regularly.” While somewhat
imprecise, what these terms are intended to pick out should be sufficiently clear for present
purposes.
I turn now to consider the implications of CANDLE-1, CANDLE-2, and LINES for our
understanding of how widely FV and MV are possessed. I begin by considering what the research
suggests regarding the satisfaction of the scope and frequency conditions of FV and MV. I then turn
to consider its implications for the satisfaction of the motivational conditions for FV and MV.

1.2. Scope and Frequency Conditions

The results of CANDLE-1 and LINES (which I will address first) support the claim that in
certain relevant contexts most people fail to engage in certain forms of intellectually flexible or
intellectually courageous activity. For, again, most of the participants fail to engage in the targeted

virtue-relevant activity. Thus they also support thinking that most people fail to always (or nearly
always) engage in intellectually flexible or intellectually courageous activity across all (or nearly all)
relevant contexts, that is, that most people fail to satisfy the scope and frequency conditions for FV.
In light of this conclusion, and given the various assumptions noted above, we may conclude
(perhaps unsurprisingly) that most people lack FV.
Do CANDLE-1 and LINES also support thinking that most people fail to satisfy the scope
and frequency conditions for MV? This is much less clear. Again, CANDLE-1 and LINES show
that in certain relevant contexts, most people fail to engage in certain forms of intellectually flexible or
intellectually courageous activity. This, however, is entirely consistent with any or all of the
following:

(i)

In the contexts in question, most people regularly engage in other forms of intellectually
flexible and intellectually courageous activity.

(ii)

In several other relevant contexts, most people regularly engage in the targeted forms of
intellectually flexible and intellectually courageous activity.

(iii)

In several other relevant contexts, most people regularly engage in other forms of
intellectually flexible and intellectually courageous activity.

If (i), (ii), or (iii) were probable, this fact would constitute considerable support for the claim that
most people in fact satisfy the scope and frequency conditions for MV. My aim here is not to
substantiate (i) – (iii). However, I do wish to show that these possibilities are not especially remote

or far-fetched. This by itself will be enough to block the inference from the shortcomings of the
participants in CANDLE-1 and LINES to the conclusion that they or others lack MV.
In support of (i), there is reason to think that while most participants in CANDLE-1 and
LINES fail to manifest certain aspects of intellectual flexibility or intellectual courage, they succeed
at manifesting other aspects of these virtues. In LINES, for instance, most of the participants assert
their belief in the face of unanimous opposition when the opposition is comprised of a sufficiently
small number of people and in the face of majority opposition that is anything less than unanimous.
It seems implausible to think that courage is required for voicing dissent when faced with
unanimous opposition of a certain size but not when that opposition is of a slightly smaller size or
when it is of the same size but just shy of unanimous. To be sure, the former scenario is likely to
require more intellectual courage or intellectual courage of a more challenging or impressive variety.
However, it hardly follows that voicing opposition in the latter scenarios manifests no intellectual
courage at all. (For a related point, see Sabini and Silver, 2005, and Adams 2006, p. 129, Ch. 9.)
A similar point holds in connection with CANDLE-1. Recall that most of the participants
successfully completed the candle task when the tacks were presented outside of the box. It is at
least an open question whether in doing so they might have manifested some intellectual flexibility.
While we might expect a maximally intellectually flexible person to be able to complete the more
challenging version of the task, why deny that a lesser degree or variety of intellectual flexibility
might be manifested in the completion of the less challenging version? At a minimum, these
possibilities should give us pause about taking either CANDLE-1 or LINES to show that most
people fail to satisfy the scope or frequency conditions for MV.2
In further support of (i), it is important to note that many participants may have manifested
the virtues in question even in their failure to engage in the targeted virtue-relevant activity. For
instance, surely the majority of participants in CANDLE-1 who failed to complete the candle task

when they were presented with the tacks inside the box did not sit idle and thoughtless for the
duration of the experiment. Rather, we may assume that many of them thought hard about a
possible solution. And it is not implausible to think that at least some of this mental activity might
have manifested intellectual flexibility—even if not enough or of the right sort to arrive at the
solution (see King, 2014, for a similar point). In other words, it may be that a number of the subjects
in CANDLE-I engage in intellectually flexible cognitive activity in their (ultimately unsuccessful)
attempts to complete the task. Similarly, it is reported that many of the subjects in LINES who
verbally denied the evidence of their senses nevertheless expressed considerable discomfort or regret
at having done so. Such discomfort might also be a form or be evidence of low-level virtue-relevant
activity (for similar arguments, see Webber, 2006, p. 204, Kamtekar 2004, p. 473, Sabini and Silver,
2005, pp. 554-5, and Swanton, 2003, pp. 30-1). For these reasons as well, the studies in question fail
to support the claim that most people fail to satisfy the scope and frequency conditions for MV.
Apropos of (ii) and (iii), there are features of the experimental contexts at issue that make it
difficult to generalize on how the participants or others are likely to behave in other (potentially
quite different) virtue-relevant contexts. One is a kind of contextual artificiality. It is not difficult to
imagine, for instance, that at least some of the subjects in CANDLE-1 might have experienced some
awkwardness or unusual pressure in the request to complete the candle task, coming as it did from a
psychological experimenter in a highly controlled environment, and that this pressure might have
played a role in their failure to do so. Suppose, for instance, that the same subjects were asked to
complete a comparable task in a more familiar or natural environment, for example, while reading
the Sunday paper at home, playing a board game with friends or family, trying to solve a logistical
problem at work, or taking an exam at school. To my mind, it is far from obvious that we should
expect the same type or level of intellectual flexibility in these other contexts as was manifested in
the experimental context (see as well Sabini and Silver, 2005, pp. 550-3, and Webber, 2006, p. 197).

Moreover, were the subjects to consistently engage in intellectually flexible activity in these other
contexts, this would appear to tell significantly in support of their possession of at least a
“moderate” degree of intellectual flexibility.
A related point applies to LINES. Note that in this experiment, no significant epistemic
good hangs in the balance. In (verbally) denying the evidence of their senses, the subjects are not,
for instance, failing to voice some conviction that is important to them or forfeiting access to some
valuable item of knowledge. It is at least an open question whether, had the epistemic stakes been
higher, many of the subjects would have exhibited greater intellectual courage. (For analogous
points, see Merritt, 2000, pp. 372-5, Kamtekar, 2004, pp. 470-6, Sreenivasan, 2002, p. 58, Snow,
2010, Chs. 4 and 5, and Mischel and Shoda, 1995.) This is significant given that, paradigmatically, an
intellectually courageous person is one who is willing to face certain fears or harms for the sake of
significant epistemic goods. These considerations underscore the possibility that many people do
regularly engage in intellectually flexible or intellectually courageous activity across several relevant
contexts.
Apropos of (i) and (iii), it extremely important to note that a single intellectual virtue can be
manifested in a very wide and diverse range of cognitive operations or activities. Consider, for
example, the virtue of open-mindedness. Open-mindedness can be manifested in attempts to
understand a difficult or foreign subject matter, the handling of counterevidence, the assessment of
an interlocutor’s point of view, the imagining of an original idea or explanation, or a decision about
whether to bring an inquiry to a close (“maintaining an open mind”). What exactly open-mindedness
demands of a person is likely to vary considerably from one of these activities to the next (see,
Baehr, 2011, Ch. 9). This underscores the importance of not equating one possible and rather finegrained manifestation of a virtue with anything like the full range of its characteristic manifestations.
Thus the ability to complete the candle task is far from equivalent to the ability to think or reason in

an intellectually flexible manner. In keeping with (i) and (iii), this suggests that while the participants
fail to perform the targeted forms of intellectually flexible and intellectually courageous activity in
the present context, they may be disposed to engage in other, potentially quite different forms of
intellectually flexible or intellectually courageous activity in the present or in other relevant contexts.
Once more: CANDLE-1 and LINES show that in certain relevant contexts, most people fail
to engage in certain forms of intellectually flexible or intellectually courageous activity. For all of the
foregoing reasons, it would be a mistake to generalize on this failure to the conclusion that most
people fail to engage in some form of intellectually flexible or intellectually courageous activity on a
regular basis and across several relevant contexts. That is, the data fail to support the claim that most
people fail to satisfy the scope and frequency conditions for MV.

1.3. Motivational Conditions

I turn now to consider what the research in question suggests concerning the satisfaction of
the motivational conditions for FV and MV. Here as well I begin with FV and then turn to MV.
According to the motivational condition for FV, to possess a given virtue V, a person’s V-relevant
activity must always (or nearly always) be robustly epistemically motivated across all (or nearly all)
virtue-relevant contexts. And a person’s V-relevant activity is robustly epistemically motivated only if
(a) it is motivated by an epistemic good as such and this motivation (b) is strong enough to cause the
activity and (c) does not depend on any epistemically arbitrary situational influences.
It is not immediately clear how the studies in question are supposed to bear on our question.
To the extent that the participants in CANDLE-1 and LINES fail to engage in the targeted virtuerelevant activity, the question of whether their virtue-relevant activity was epistemically motivated is
moot. Thus CANDLE-1 and LINES are not very illuminating in this context. CANDLE-2,

however, is relevant. Recall that in this study most participants who received candy or were shown a
brief comedy went on to complete the tacks-inside-the-box version of the candle task, while most
participants who were not given a mood enhancer failed to complete the task. This is sufficient
evidence for thinking that the intellectually flexible activity of most of the participants was not
epistemically motivated in the relevant sense, for it fails to satisfy condition (c) above. Specifically,
while most participants given candy or shown a comedy engaged in the targeted activity, the
motivation for this activity apparently received a significant boost from an epistemically arbitrary
situational factor (viz. the mood enhancer). This in turn supports the conclusion (especially when
conjoined with several of the assumptions noted above) that most people’s intellectually flexible
activity is not always (or nearly always) robustly epistemically motivated across all (or nearly all)
relevant contexts. Given the further assumption that similar results could be obtained in connection
with other intellectual virtues, we may conclude that most people fail to satisfy the motivational
conditions for FV.
Does it also warrant concluding that most people fail to satisfy the motivational conditions
for MV? That is, does it merit concluding that most people’s virtue-relevant activity is not regularly
robustly epistemically motivated across several virtue-relevant contexts? For two of the reasons
discussed above in connection with the scope and frequency conditions for MV, this conclusion is
not substantiated.
First, given the wide range of activities in which a single virtue can be manifested or
expressed, there may very well exist other forms of intellectually flexible activity that are sufficiently
different from or less demanding than the targeted activity, such that most people’s engagement in this
activity would be robustly epistemically motivated to the relevant extent. Again, the fact that S’s
completion of the candle task is not robustly epistemically motivated hardly supports the conclusion

that S’s performance of any number of other types of intellectually flexible activity would also lack
such motivation.
Second, the potential awkwardness or artificiality of the experimental context in question
also makes it difficult to generalize on the level of motivation operative in this context. Specifically,
this feature of the context underscores the possibility that in other, more natural epistemic contexts,
most people’s engagement in the targeted or other forms intellectually flexible activity would be
robustly epistemically motivated. Similarly, in other contexts, significant epistemic goods might be at
stake, which in turn might bolster most people’s epistemic motivation. In the present context, the
good hanging in the balance is something akin to the solving of a trivial puzzle. This is not an
especially interesting epistemic end. Thus if our concern is with the extent to which people’s
intellectually flexible activity is robustly epistemically motivated, we would do much better to
examine such activity in contexts in which a significant epistemic good is at stake—contexts in
which, say, the persons in question are genuinely curious about the matter in question. (The latter
point is similar to claims others have made in defense of virtue ethics vis-à-vis situationist
objections. See, for example, Flanagan, 1991; Merritt, 2000; Kamtekar, 2004; Russell, 2009; Snow,
2010; and Cokelet, 2014. Even Nisbett and Ross, 1991, emphasize the importance of subjective
construal in this regard.)
For these reasons, we may conclude that CANDLE-2 fails to support the claim that most
people’s virtue-relevant activity is not regularly robustly epistemically motivated across several virtuerelevant contexts. Thus it fails to provide support for thinking that most people fail to satisfy the
motivational condition for MV.
We are now in a position to draw a more general conclusion. We have found that the
combination of CANDLE-1, CANDLE-2, LINES, and several assumptions favorable to the
situationist position supports thinking that most people lack FV but fails to show that most people

lack MV. My claim is not that most people do possess MV. Rather, it is merely that the empirical data
do not present a good reason for thinking otherwise. This in turn shows that the situationist
research in question does not present a serious obstacle to thinking of intellectual character growth
as a realistic educational aim.

2. The Transformation Objection

One can accept the possibility that intellectual virtue is a real and relatively familiar
phenomenon while denying that intellectual character growth is a realistic educational aim. As
indicated earlier, intellectual character growth involves deep personal change. Therefore, given that
the intellectual character of most students is already substantially formed by the time they enter the
classroom, and given the limited time and influence teachers have with their students, efforts to
foster intellectual character growth in an educational setting are unlikely to be very successful.
This objection can be dealt with more quickly than the situationist objection considered
above. As with the situationist objection, the target of the “transformation objection” is multiply
ambiguous. Once this ambiguity is brought to light, it emerges that while certain approaches to
fostering intellectual character growth in an educational setting may be unrealistic, others evidently
are not.
How unrealistic is it to think that educators might have the suggested impact on the
intellectual character of their students? Unsurprisingly, this depends on how exactly we are thinking
about the efforts and impact in question. It depends, for instance, on the following:

(i)

Who is undertaking the effort? Is it a single teacher, a group of teachers, or an entire
school?

(ii)

At what developmental level? Is the effort being undertaken while students’ intellectual
character is highly malleable (e.g. in elementary school) or when their traits are more
fully formed (e.g. in college)?

(iii)

What is the quality of the relevant efforts? Are the educators in question acting on their
own best guesses? Or are they relying heavily on the best research in educational
psychology and other relevant disciplines (e.g. research on intrinsic epistemic
motivation, a “growth mindset” [Dweck, 2006], and “thinking dispositions”
[Ritchhart, 2002])?

(iv)

What is the expected magnitude of the impact? Is the expectation that the students in
question will become exemplars of intellectual virtue? Or merely that they will
exhibit meaningful or worthwhile growth in these qualities?

(v)

What is the expected scope of the impact? Is the idea that every student will experience the
relevant amount of intellectual character growth? Or only that some subset or
percentage of students will?

(vi)

What is the relevant timeframe? Is the suggestion that students will experience significant
intellectual character growth over the period of a semester? A year? Four years?

Whether a given attempt to foster growth in intellectual virtues is realistic or likely to succeed
ultimately is an empirical question. However, my suggestion is that even in the absence of data from

controlled experiments or other empirical research, we can be reasonably confident that while some
such efforts are likely to fail, others have significant promise. To illustrate, consider the following
possible scenarios, each of which describes an attempt to foster intellectual character growth in an
educational setting:

Scenario 1: (i) A single inexperienced instructor (ii) at the university level (iii) proceeding
mainly on the basis of her own best guesses (iv) fosters high levels of intellectual virtue (v) in
all of her students (vi) over the course of one semester.

Scenario 2: (i) An entire school (ii) at the K-12 level (iii) employs the best available research
(iv) to foster moderate levels of at least three core intellectual virtues (v) in a significant
percentage of their students (vi) over the course of the students’ 13 years at the school.

Scenario 3: (i) A group of experienced teachers working together (ii) at the middle school
level and (iii) employing the best available research (iv) fosters meaningful growth in at least
three core intellectual virtues (v) for a substantial number of students (vi) over the course of
the students’ three years at the school.

Scenario 4: (i/ii) A university (iii) employing the best available research develops a program
that, for (v) for the majority of its students (vi) in their four years at the school, (iv) raises the
students’ awareness of the nature/value of intellectual virtues, increases their understanding
of their own intellectual character strengths and weaknesses, creates systematic opportunities
for them to practice a wide range of intellectual virtues, and provides extensive qualitative
feedback regarding these efforts.

Of the scenarios just described, the first is obviously unrealistic. And it is not difficult to imagine
similar variations that would be equally implausible. The second, third, and fourth scenarios, while
still involving meaningful levels of intellectual character growth, are much less ambitious. Indeed,
while we cannot, from the philosophical armchair, be certain about their prospects, my suggestion is
that cautious optimism about these prospects is warranted. That is, it is not implausible to think that
with the right kind of resources, methods, and support, educators could hope to have a significant
positive impact on the intellectual character of many of their students (see Perkins, 1993, and
Ritchhart, 2002). If this is right, we may conclude that while the transformation objection has force
against certain conceptions of intellectual character growth and ways of pursuing such growth, it
leaves untouched several other conceptions and approaches. The fact that intellectual character
growth involves a kind of personal change or transformation should not by itself lead us to regard it
as an unrealistic educational aim.

3. Costliness Objection

The approaches to fostering intellectual character growth sketched in the scenarios above are
demanding. They require, at a minimum, substantial teacher buy in and training as well as ongoing
commitment and effort from teachers and school leaders. This observation gives rise to a third
objection. Many schools already lack adequate resources for quality professional development and
special programs. Morale among public school principals and teachers is at a 25-year low (Gardner,
2013). And educators at many levels already feel hard-pressed to discharge even their more formal
(e.g. curricular) responsibilities in the allotted time and with the allotted resources. For these and

related reasons, intellectual character growth may still seem like an unrealistic educational aim. At a
minimum, it may not seem achievable on a very wide scale.
This objection turns in part on a mistaken view of the requirements of educating for
intellectual character growth. Specifically, it intimates that fostering such growth is something an
educator does over and above her usual efforts to impart knowledge and foster a range of intellectual
skills. While understandable, this suggestion is largely mistaken. As I have argued elsewhere (Baehr,
2013), the most promising approach to educating for growth in intellectual virtues does involve
familiarizing students with certain virtue-relevant terms and concepts. However, this is something
that can be done very quickly. For the most part, educating for growth in intellectual virtues is a
matter of imparting knowledge and sharpening skills of a certain sort and in a certain way. Specifically, it
involves a heavy emphasis on such values and activities as thinking, inquiry, question-asking, selfreflection, intellectual risk-taking, and conceptual understanding. Many of these values and activities
are compatible with traditional modes of instruction.
This point notwithstanding, there are real costs involved with trying to educate for
intellectual character growth and these costs need to be honestly confronted. I turn now to address
what I think are the two most significant costs. I then turn to highlight several aspects of the value of
intellectual virtues. Here my aim is to show that while there are genuine costs associated with trying
to educate for growth in intellectual virtues, these costs generally are worth incurring. To the extent
that this value is made known and appreciated among educators and educational policy makers, the
widespread adoption of intellectual character growth as an educational goal may begin to appear
more realistic.
The first real cost concerns the emphasis alluded to above on a deep understanding of the
subject matter. This emphasis is an indispensable part of trying to foster growth in intellectual
virtues. Intellectual virtues aim at deep understanding of important subject matters (Baehr, 2014). An

intellectually virtuous person is one who pays close attention to detail, takes pains to avoid errors, is
thoughtful and rigorous in her inquiries, and so on, out of a desire for deep understanding. She is
not motivated by or satisfied with a cursory grasp of important information; nor is she inclined
merely to memorize important facts and formulas. Rather, she desires to know—to understand—
these things. Accordingly, educating for intellectual character growth requires educating for deep
understanding. The problem is that given a fixed and limited number of instructional minutes, a
focus on depth generally requires some kind of compromise on breadth. Thus if tasked with
educating for intellectual character growth, many teachers are likely to find themselves struggling to
cover all of the requisite material.
While the tension between breadth of coverage and depth of understanding is real (and
hardly unique to educating for intellectual virtues), and while this tension is likely to complicate
attempts to educate for intellectual character growth in some academic settings, there are ways of
minimizing this tension. These range from eliminating all non-essential content and busywork to
making strategic use of projects and assignments completed outside of class (e.g. “inverted
instruction”). Furthermore, there are broader educational trends—particularly in K-12 public
education in the United States—that suggest a growing dissatisfaction with academic curricula and
state standards that are “a mile wide and an inch deep” as well as a growing interest in curricula and
standards that focus on cognitive skills like critical thinking and on conceptual understanding over
rote memorization (see, for example, the new Common Core State Standards at
www.corestandards.org). If broader educational thinking continues to move in this direction—
emphasizing, as it were, the quality of knowledge over the quantity—then the challenge of teaching
for deep understanding may dissipate.
A second and more significant cost associated with educating for intellectual character
growth concerns the kind of buy in, training, and ongoing commitment and support that are part

and parcel to such an undertaking. In certain contexts, this cost may not be too significant. If a
teacher’s educational values and practices are already fairly well aligned with educating for
intellectual intellectual virtues, and if these values and practices are supported by the surrounding
educational environment and culture, then the transition to a more systematic and explicit focus on
intellectual character growth may be natural and relatively smooth. However, in many other
contexts, embracing intellectual character growth as an educational goal is likely to require significant
changes—changes in how teachers and administrators understand their role as educators, in what
they value, in how they make decisions, in some of their pedagogical techniques and strategies, and
more.
To my mind, this is the most formidable obstacle to a widespread practice of educating for
intellectual virtues. However, I think the difficulty of overcoming it depends in no small part on how
educators perceive the value of the change in question, which itself is susceptible to educative efforts.
Accordingly, in the remainder of this section, I briefly highlight several normative dimensions of
intellectual virtue. To the extent that educators are made aware of and convinced of this value, the
widespread adoption of intellectual character growth as an educational ideal may be more realistic
than what has just been suggested.
Curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, intellectual courage, and other intellectual
character virtues are attractive and admirable personal traits. They are qualities that we generally
desire in ourselves and in our friends, spouses, and children. They are partly constitutive of what it is
to be a good person or to flourish as a human being. Conceiving of education as aimed at growth in
these traits—as aimed at becoming a certain type of person—adds a dimension of meaning and purpose
to the educational enterprise that practitioners are likely to find compelling and motivating. Compare
this more familiar educational goals, for example, high scores on annual state tests. The better
teachers among are not inspired and motivated by this goal. While they may view such scores as

partial indicators of academic success, they do not confuse them with the very point of education. In
this way, the pursuit of intellectual character growth in an educational context has the potential to
add a humanizing and intrinsically rewarding dimension to the activities of teaching and learning.
The foregoing point underscores the intrinsic value of intellectual virtues and the positive
bearing of such value on educational efforts aimed at fostering growth in these traits. But it is also
important to call attention to the broadly instrumental value of intellectual virtues. This includes
their relation to certain important moral, political, and prudential goods.
As many philosophers and others have noted, we act on the basis of our beliefs. For this
reason, the moral quality of our actions often is a function of the quality of the beliefs that give rise
to or guide these actions. If we form beliefs in ways that are narrow-minded, biased, intellectually
lazy, or dogmatic, then the moral quality of the actions based on these beliefs is likely to suffer. We
might be led to act in ways that are negligent, disrespectful, or cruel. Conversely, if we are, say,
careful, thorough, attentive, honest, and open in how we go about forming our beliefs, this can have
a significant positive effect on the moral status of our actions. It can facilitate actions that are
respectful, thoughtful, and compassionate. Thus an exercise of intellectual virtues is importantly
related to morally responsible action (Montmarquet, 1993).
The exercise of intellectual virtues is also central to a healthy democracy. For a liberal
democracy to flourish, its citizens must engage in certain forms of intellectual activity. They must be
curious and thoughtful about political matters and cultivate informed perspectives on these matters
through careful and thorough research and reflection. They must also exercise the intellectual
autonomy and courage necessary for scrutinizing the actions of their government and for
challenging these actions when they are deemed questionable. These actions are facilitated by a free
press whose representatives are willing to investigate thoroughly and to report fairly and objectively.
A healthy democracy also requires a willingness among politicians and their constituents to engage in

public debate marked by qualities ranging from intellectual honesty and open-mindedness to
intellectual courage and tenacity. In these and many other ways, a healthy democracy depends on its
citizens having and exercising a wide range of intellectual virtues (Hazlett, 2016; Nussbaum, 2010).
In the current economy, intellectual virtues also have a high degree of prudential value.
Given the centrality of technology to the global economy and to many domestic economies,
together with the rapid rate at which technology evolves, employers today tend to be less concerned
with what their employees learned in school and more with how well they can think and learn. This
point is illustrated by the current emphasis in the job market on so-called “soft skills,” which include
several intellectual virtues like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual
humility (Friedman, 2014; Heckman 2000). As the character traits of a good thinker or learner,
intellectual virtues are vital part of what students need if their education is going to prepare them to
for success in the labor market.
We began in this section by considering an objection to the effect that intellectual character
growth is an unrealistic educational aim because it is too costly. In response I have sought to
underscore the significant and wide-ranging value of intellectual virtues. My suggestion is that if
teachers and administrators are made aware of and become convinced of this value, they may be
more willing to make the relevant changes and adjustments. If so, this makes the widespread
adoption of intellectual character growth as an educational ideal a more realistic prospect.3
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1

A rather different response to the situationist challenge that I will not develop here is to accept that

at present intellectual virtue is a rare phenomenon but that educative efforts are capable of changing
this. For arguments to this effect, see Ritchhart, 2002, and Perkins, 1993.
2

Depending on how “contexts” are to be individuated, the scenarios described in this and the

preceding paragraphs may seem to include contexts different from the original one. If so, they
would support (ii) or (iii) not (i). I do not have a firm opinion about how to individuate contexts.
Below I give some examples of contexts that seem more clearly to be distinct from the original
experimental context; however, were the contexts described in the present and preceding scenarios
also deemed different from the original context, this would have little bearing on my argument,
especially as I offer additional support for (i) below.
3

I am grateful to Heather Battaly, two anonymous referees for very helpful feedback on an earlier

draft of this paper.

